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A DECISION THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS OF THE
DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE DURING WORLD WAR II
I .N . Gallhofer, W .E . Saris+
This paper describes a decision theoretical analysis of decisions
of the Dutch government in exile in London in 1940/41 with re-
spect to the transference of the seat of the government to the
Dutch East-Indies.
Combined with a text-analysis procedure developed by the authors,
the decision theoretical approach to the related documents pro-
duced very useful insights : the decision process and the in-
fluence-pattern of the different governmental advisers could
be detected and the decision rules which explain the choices
could be perfectly predicted, based on the quality of the
value- and probability statements .(1)
1 . INTRODUCTI0N(2)
Shortly after the German invasion of the neutral Netherlands on
May 10, 1940, the Dutch government and the Queen fled to Britain
and established in London the seat of the ,government in exile . They
became allies with the British and French in the war against
Germany . Although the government and the Queen lived in exile, they
still possessed a vast free territory, the Dutch East-Indies, ad-
ministered by the Dutch Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh
Stachouwer.
Therefore quite soon after the occupation of the motherland, the
government considered whether or not it would be advisable to
transfer its seat to its colony. With the entrance of Italy into the war
on the German side (June 10, 1940), and the French armistice with
Germany (June 22, 1940), the transference question was considered
to be even more urgent since these new developments affected Dutch
relations with the above mentioned nations.
A study of the documents shows that the deliberations with respect
to the transference of the seat of the government took place in two
phases, i.e. from June 1940 till August 1940 and again in January 1941.
We here analyze, by means of a systematic procedure, this decision
making process . Furthermore, we investigate whether decision models
found in experimental studies can also explain the choices in this
real life situation.
The following sections first discuss the decision theoretical
approach, the methodology and the hypotheses with respect to the
applicability of decision models . Thereafter, the results are des-
cribed and, subsequently, some conclusions are drawn.
+ Address all communications to : I .N . Gallhofer, W .E . Saris,
Decision analysis research unit, Free University, Department
of Methods and Techniques, de Boelelaan 1115, 1007 MC Amsterdam,
P .O . Box 7161
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2 . THE DECISION THEORETICAL APPROACH
Decision theory has been developed as a normative approach to de-
cision making by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (3) . Applying this
approach to descriptive studies(4) the same concepts are used as
in normative studies, i .e . possible actions, outcomes, subjective
probabilities and values of the outcomes . Given these characteris-
tics, a decision problem can be represented by a decision tree(5)
and summarized in a decision diagram . A simplified example of the
decisions discussed in this paper is presented in table 1.
Table 1 : Simplified example of a decision problem
Transfer the seat
of the government
from London to
the East-Indies
Strategies
Transfer a minority
of ministers perms-
nently or temporari-
lyto the East-
Do not transfer
the seat of the
government
Outcomes (Si)
Indies
(S2) (S3)
Position of the
government:
improved/
maintained (01) V11 P11 V12 P12 V13 P13
deteriora-
ted
	
(02) V21 (1-P11) V22 (1-P12) V23 (1-P13)
Position of the
East-Indies:
maintained (03) V31 P31 V32 P32 V33 P33
deteriora-
ted
	
(04) V41 (1-P31) V42 (1-P32) V43 (1-P33)
Position of the
motherland:
improved/
maintained (05) V51 P51 V52 (P52) V53 P53
deteriora-
ted
	
(06) V61 (1-P51) V62 (1-P52) V63 (1-P53)
Table 1 shows that the decision maker considered three possible
strategies
. In order to make a choice he specified the consequences
which he considered to be relevant for the different actions
. We
restrict ourselves here to three groups of possible consequences
which were considered to be most important, i
.e . those relating to
the position of the government, to that of the East-Indies and that
of the motherland
. Each decision maker could also specify how like-
ly he thought each outcome was (pij) or for the opposite (1-pij) and
the values he attached to the different outcomes (Vij)
. Since he
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could consider quite different objects relating to outcomes
indicated by the same label under different strategies, the values of
these outcomes are not necessarily the same and therefore the
V's are indicated by variable subscripts ..
Even if all this information is specified, it is not at all clear
how a decision maker will make his choice between the 3 strategies.
In the literature a large number of models or decision rules are
postulated for describing the choices of decision makers in experi-
mental situations (6) . Gallhofer and Saris(7) have given examples
from real life studies . Since most of the models are described in
detail in the literature we restrict ourselves to describing only
some choice rules, especially those which will later prove to be
applicable to our data.
The Subjective Expected Utility model assumes that a decision maker
evaluates all the outcomes of the alternative strategies he per-
ceives and that he can also indicate their probabilities of occurring.
The expected utility of a strategy is defined as a composite function
of the utilities of the outcomes and their probabilities:
EU(Sj) = 1 pij Vij
where EU(Sj) indicates the expected utility under strategy j and
pij the probability of the occurrence of outcome i under
strategy j
	
and
Vij the utility of outcome i under strategy j.
The decision rule consists of selecting the strategy with the highest
expected utility.
The risk-avoiding rules have been developed by the authors since
other models did not fit the data in previous research .(8) The choice
rule refers to selecting the strategy with the hi ghestprobability
of positive outcomes or, which amounts to the same thing - since the
sum of the probabilities is assumed to be 1 - of selecting the stra-
tegy with the lowest probability of negative outcomes . The risk-
avoiding rules can be expressed more formally as follows:
If p-i < p-j => Si is chosen
or equivalently
if p+i > p+j => Si is chosen.
where p-i,p-j are the probabilities of negative outcomes under
strategy i or j
and
	
p+i,p+j are the probabilities of positive outcomes under
strategy i or j.
When the Dominance or the Lexicographic or the Addition of Utilities
rule are used the decision maker splits the outcomes up in several
dimensions (also called attributes or aspects) . When the choice is
made by the dominance rule the decision maker selects that alter-
native which is better than the other(s) on at least one dimension
and not worse than the other strategy (-ies) on all the other attri-
butes.
In the case where a decision maker chooses lexicographically, he first
rank-orders the attributes in importance and then chooses the strate-
gy which is most attractive on the most important attribute . If two
strategies on this attribute are equally attractive, the decision
is based on the next most attractive dimension
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in order of importance . When the choice is made by the addition
of utilities rule the decision is based on a "summation" of all
the values corresponding to the aspects for each strategy . The
decision maker then indicates ex plicitly an overall value
statement for each strategy and chooses the strategy with the highest
value.
The satisficing rule(9) states that the decision maker has to choose
the first strategy he detects which leads to satisfactory outcomes
only.
The reversed Simon rule, which has been developed by the authors
to encompass political situations for which no satisfactory strate-
gy was available, consists of excluding all the strategies which
lead with certainty to negative outcomes only, as long as a stra-
tegy exists with the possibility of a positive outcome.
3
. HYPOTHESES WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF DECISION . RULES
Table 2 specifies our hypotheses with respect to the relationship
between the quality (i .e . the level of measurement) of the data and
the use of the different decision rules . The category "limited use
of probabilities" refers to nominal statements by which we under-
stand that only the possibility of occurring is indicated while or-
dinal probabilities ("use of probabilities") specify the relative
size of the probability . The definition of ordinal and nominal
values is similar : nominal values ("limited use of values") only in-
dicate the affective meaning of positive/negative while ordinal
values ("use of values") indicate the size of the value.
Table 2 : Classification of decision rules with respect to the
use of values and probabilities in the choice rule
use of values
	
limited use. of values
Use of proba-
	
SEU model
bilities
	
etc .
Risk-avoiding rules
I
	
II
Limited use of
	
Dominance-, Lexi-
	
Simon's Satisficing rule
probabilites
	
cographic-, Addi-
	
Reversed Simon rule
tion of Utilities
rule etc.
III
	
-
.I.V	
Table 2 specifies the following hypotheses:
1
. In order to use the Subjective Expected Utility model (SEU) the
decision makers have to describe their probabilities and values
at least in rank-ordered verbal statements.
Although more specific information is in fact necessary one can
assume that ordinal statements are translations of numerical in-
formation into ordinary language
. Thus ordinal probabilities and
values are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the use
of this model . Therefore, we test here the hypothesis that the
SEU-model can explain the choices of the decision makers where
ordinal probabilities and values have been used by them.
2 . In order to use the risk-avoiding rules the decision makers have
to describe the decision problem with ordinal probabilities and
nominal utility statements. We test whether these rules can
describe the choices in the class II cases.
3 . In order to use the dominance or the lexicographic rule, the
utilities should be rank-ordered while the probabilities could
be nominal . Here we test the hypothesis that these rules can
describe the choices in the class III cases.
4 . Finally, in class IV no ordinal characteristics are required . We
test whether the Simon model or the Reversed Simon model can des-
cribe the choices for those cases where this description holds.
How these tests are done is discussed after we have introduced
the data and the text-analysis instrument.
4. THE DATA
The documents used in this study come from the archives of the Dutch
Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . They have
all been published yet
. We searched for documents containing the
discussion of available strategies with respect to the transference
of the seat of the government in the period of June 1940 till Fe-
bruary 1941
. In total 12 documents were detected discussing this
specific topic . They consist of minutes of the Dutch Council of
Ministers, Letters from ambassadors to the minister of Foreign
Affairs and coded telegrams from the Governor General of the Dutch
East-Indies, all of which form our raw data base . As far as we know,
our collection of documents is complete with respect to the existing
written material on this topic.
5 . METHODOLOGY
5
.1 The text-analysis instrument
Because a highly reliable coding instrument is important for the
analyses, a text-analysis instrument has been developed by the
authors for this kind of data .(10) The procedure provides almost
optimal intersubjective agreement
.(11) The task of the coders is
to derive a politician's decision tree on the basis of his written
report . It is done in three steps:
1. The coder reads the text
2. He searches the following decision making concepts:
- available actions of one's own party
- possible actions of the other party (-ies)
- possible outcomes for one's own party
- subjective values of the possible outcomes
- subjective probabilities of the outcomes and the actions
of the other party (-ies)
8. He elaborates a decision tree, combining the different parts of
the argument
.
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These steps are first executed individually and, thereafter a joint
solution by a team of two coders is developed
. The agreement for
the construction of decision trees between individual coders is
usually between 0
.8 and 1 .0 .(12) When two teams of coders, who
correct each others mistakes, are used, the agreement between
teams of coders is very close to 1 .0 . In this case study, the
average agreement between the individual coders relating to 12
decision trees was 0 .87
. The two coders always came to a unanimous
conclusion when comparing their results . It is expected, according
to our earlier study(13) that this joint result will usually be
identical with the result obtained from other teams of two coders.
5 .2 The test of the fit of the models
Given the probability and utility statements used by the decision
makers, the decision problem can be classified in one of the four
classes shown in table 2
. As the quality of these probability and
utility statements is only a necessary condition for the applicabi-
lity of the different model(s), the fit of the model to the data
remains to be tested . This can be done by applying the decision
rule(s) of the given class to the specific case, filling in the
probability and utility statements used by the decision maker in
the formulas . If this leads to the same conclusion that the de-
cision maker has drawn, we say that the model fits or explains the
choice . If the conclusion differs, the model can not explain the
choice of the decision maker.
5 .3 Simplification of the description
In order to obtain a simpler description of the situations, we pre-
sent in table 3, for the cases where a decision maker used rank or-
dered probabilities, only the evaluation of the most likely outcome.
When a decision maker considered several outcomes as possible, the
evaluations of all possible outcomes are indicated . If the decision
maker thought that a positive outcome was most likely or possible,
we have denoted this by a plus sign
. If he thought that a negative
outcome was most likely or possible, a minus sign is used
. Further-
more we have restricted the overview to only three kinds of out-
comes : the consequences relating to the position of the government,
to that of the East-Indies and that of the motherland . Sometimes
more consequences were mentioned but as the great majority of the
decision makers mostly made use of the first three, we have only
taken into account these three consequences in our summary in
table 3 .
6 . RESULTS
In the following we describe the results of our analysis of the 12
individual decisions dealing with whether or not the Dutch govern-
mental seat should be transferred from London to the East-Indies
(see table 1)
. As they relate to a longer period (from June 1940
till January 1941) they can be subdivided into two phases according
to the political developments .
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6 .1 Decision phase 1, June till August 1940
In a letter dated May 31, with the imminent danger of Italy's en-
trance into the war on the German side, the Dutch ambassador to
Italy advised the minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Kleffens, to
transfer the seat of the government to the East-Indies (S1) .(14)
As an alternative strategy he considered not transferring the go-
vernmental seat (S3) . For both strategies he examined the same con-
sequences, i .e . whether or not it would be possible to maintain the
status quo in the East-Indies with respect to Japan, and whether
or not it would be possible to avoid war with Italy . When the go-
vernment would stay in London (S3), he considered it possible that
the status of the East-Indies might be maintained and that they
would not have to side with their British Ally in the war against
Italy. However, the alternative outcome, i .e . that there would be
troubles with Japan in the East-Indies and war with Italy, could
also occur . When the seat of the government would be transferred
(Si), he was certain that at least the status quo of the East-In-
dies could be maintained because of the presence of the government
in this region, while war with Italy was equally possible, as under
the alternative strategy . The decision maker chose the first stra-
tegy . Based on the rank-ordered values(15) and the nominal probabi-
lities the ambassador indicated, models of cell III (table 2) had
to be tested and the Dominance rule indeed explained the choice.
The ambassador thus chose the strategy which was better than the
other on one dimension and not worse than the other on all the
other attributes.
In June the Council of Ministers seemed to have seriously consi-
dered the so called "great plan of the East-Indies" (S1) . There is,
however, no written material available with respect to the decision
arguments .(16)
When Italy entered into the war on June 10, the Dutch government
avoided participating directly in the hostilities by not issuing
a declaration of war . Nevertheless, measures favorable to the
British ally were taken and, on Italy's request diplomatic re-
lations were broken .(17)
Meanwhile a great majority of the ministers supported the transfe-
rence of the seat of the government to the East-Indies .(18) At the
end of June the government sought the assent of the Queen for this .
decision . This plan namely also assumed that the Queen would follow
the government . Queen Wilhelmina, however, strongly opposed this
decision, indicating only that she could not physically abide in
the climate of the East-Indies and made a counter-proposal to trans-
fer some ministers, the so called "small plan of the East-Indies" .(19)
Since a majority of the ministers still favored the transference of
the government, the Council of Ministers tried to convince the monarch
by their arguments . On July 13, Prime-Minister de Geer considered the
following three strategies in a letter to the Queen (20) :to transfer
the seat of the government (Si), to transfer a minority of ministers
permanently to the East-Indies (S2) or to not transfer the seat of
the government (S3) . By adopting the Queen's counter-proposal (S2),
there was a high probability that the government would be definitely
split which was considered to be negative . As the probability of the
alternative, positive outcome was very small, the Council of Mi-
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nisters rejected this strategy
. When considering Si and S3, De Geer
examined the same aspects of consequences : whether or not the
Dutch relations with France would be damaged since France had en-
tered into an armistice with Germany on June 22 and was no longer
an ally of the British and Dutch ; whether or not the prestige of
the Dutch government would decline ; and whether or not war with
Japan, because of its interest in the East-Indies, could be avoided.
When the government would continue to stay in London (S3) the proba-
bility was high that the Dutch relations with France would be da-
maged, that the prestige of the government would decline and that
war with Japan would occur . There was, however, also a small pro-
bability that besides damage of the relations with France and the
decline of the prestige of the government, no war with Japan would
occur
. In the case where Si would be adopted, the probability was
high that the relations with France would not be damaged, the pres-
tige of the government would not decline and the difficulties with
Japan could be peacefully resolved, since the government would be
residing in its own territory and would be seen to be less depen-
dent on its British ally . The alternative outcome that besides main-
taining good relations with France and the prestige of the
government, war with Japan would occur, had a small probability of occur-
ring.
For all strategies the Prime-Minister indicated rank-ordered proba-
bilites and nominal values . The Risk-Avoiding rule (cell II, table 2)
had to be tested and indeed explained his choice . Notwithstanding
these arguments, the Queen persisted with her counter-proposal .(21)
The Prime-Minister, therefore, in a letter to the Queen on July 19,
again advised against implementing S2 .(22)
When transferring some ministers to the East-Indies (S2) the task
of these ministers would certainly not be of much significance, be-
cause they would not be able to take part in the deliberations of
the remaining Cabinet . The Prime-Minister considered the disadvan-
tages greater than the advantages . In contrary, a transfer of the
entire Cabinet (Si), a strategy which was still available, would
undoubtedly lead to a more satisfactory fulfillment of the govern-
mental task, since they would be residing in their own territory.
The advantages of this strategy were far superior . Based on the no-
minal probabilities and the ordinal values that the Prime Minister
indicated, models of cell III (table 2) had to be tested
. The Addi-
tion of Utilities rule produced the decision maker's choice
.(23)
Since the Queen could not be convinced of the merits of the advice
of the Cabinet and still requested the implementation of the se-
cond strategy, the government proposed that they ask the Governor
General's advice on this matter .(24) On August 7, the Governor Ge-
neral also advised against transferring some ministers to the East-
Indies (S2) .(25)
According to Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, only negative out-
comes could occur (S2) : there was a high probability that these
ministers might be considered dispensable, that misunderstanding
could arise concerning their competence, and that the difficulties
could increase during the Japanese-Dutch negotiations
. At least,
but also much less likely, the ministers might be considered
dispensable and misunderstandings would occur concerning their com-
petence
. When one would transfer the Cabinet (Si), the Governor Ge-
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neral was certain that both the position of the government and that
of the East-Indies would improve . Based on the nominal values and
the ordinal probabilities the Risk-Avoiding rule had to be tested
and indeed produced the choice of the Governor General . On the same
day the Dutch ambassador to Belgium also advised the minister of
Foreign Affairs to transfer the seat of the government .(26) When
the government would continue to stay in London (S3) its prestige
would certainly decline and the Netherlands would not be freed . If
they transferred the seat of the government to the East-Indies (Si)
at least the Dutch position with respect to the United States would
improve ; moreover the possibility also existed that war with Japan
could be avoided . Based on the nominal values (27) and probabilities
the ambassador indicated, models of cell IV (table 2) had to be tes-
ted and the Reversed Simon rule produced the choice.
On August 16 the minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Kleffens, com-
municated to the Dutch ambassador in Belgium the arguments for the
final choice of the government to continue to stay in London (S3) .(28)
Van Kleffens mentioned that the strategy of the transference of the
seat of the government (S1), although preferred by a majority of the
Cabinet, was no longer available since the Queen had opposed it . The
rejection of this strategy did not occur on the basis of a decision
rule . The ministers did not discuss, for example, the advantages or
disadvantages of disobeying the Queen . The acceptation of the
Queen's will even seemed to be constitutionally unnecessary, since
the ministers were responsible to the parliament . One therefore can
only guess that the government complied with the Queen's wishes as
there was no parliament available for consultation.
After having rejected the first strategy, the Council of ministers
had considered the following remaining strategies : to transfer a
minority of the ministers permanently or temporarily to the
East-Indies (S2), to not transfer the seat of the government (S3)
and to transfer the seat of the government to another non-Dutch
territory (S4) . By implementing the fourth strategy the government
would have certainly lost its contact with and its influence over
the British ally, which was negatively evaluated . The second stra-
tegy also was disadvantageous since the Cabinet would be impeded in
arriving at decisions because of the lack of at least the continua-
tion of the contact with and the influence over the British ally.
Based on the nominal values and probabilities the minister indicated,
models of cell IV (table 2) had to be tested and Simon's rule pro-
duced the choice . According to the arguments of the minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet had chosen the most satisfactory stra-
tegy among the available courses of action.
The decisions of this phase are all summarized in table 3 after
simplifications described in section 5 .3 were applied.
6 .2 Decision phase 2, January 1941
In the beginning of January 1941, a note from the Governor General
reached the Council of Ministers in which the former advised the Ca-
binet again to transfer the seat of the government to the East-In-
dies .(29) If the government continued to stay in London (S3) its
prestige would certainly decline, its dependence on the British ally
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would increase and its relations with the East-Indies would worsen.
When the seat would be transferred to the East-Indies (Si) only po-
sitive outcomes could occur : the prestige of the gorvernment would
increase, it could better fulfill its governmental task since it
would be less dependent on the British and its relations with the
East-Indies would considerably improve which would facilitate
problem solving. Based on the nominal values and probabilities the
Governor Gèneral indicated, the models of cell IV (table 2) had to
be tested and both Simon's and the Reversed Simon rule explained
the choice.
On January 17 and 18, the Council of Ministers deliberated again on
this matter-(30) The arguments of five ministers were complete enough
to be subjected to a decision analysis . The minister of Commerce and
Industries, who was an advocate of the transference of the seat (S1),
reasoned along similar lines to the Governor General . In the case
where the government continued to stay in London (S3), its prestige
would certainly decline, its dependence on the British would in-
crease and no support would be given to the Governor General . If
the government went to the East-Indies (SI) its position would cer-
tainly be improved, it could act more independently and support
would be given to the Governor General . Based on the nominal values
and probabilities the decision maker used, his choice for the first
strategy can be explained by Simon's - or the Reversed Simon rule.
The remaining four ministers were advocates of the third strategy.
The arguments of the ministers of Education and Colonies were iden-
tical . When considering the transference of the seat (S1), they
were certain that the government would be accused of relinquishing
its common interests with the British, and that this would be fa
tal for the motherland . In the case where they stayed in London (S3),
it was certain that no negative effects would oocur : the common in-
terests. with the British would be strengthened . Since the decision
makers used nominal values and probabilities, models of cell IV
(table 2) had to be tested and Simon's or the Reversed Simon rule
indeed produced the choice.
The minister of Public Works considered for the first and third stra-
tegy the same aspects of consequences(31), i .e . whether or not the
position of the government would deteriorate, whether or not it
would cause harm to the motherland and the remaining kingdom and
whether or not the position of the East-Indies would improve . In
the case where they would move to the East-Indies (Si) certainly
great, but only temporary advantages would be achieved internation-
ally for the East-Indies . The government, however, would at least
lose its influence over the British ally and the possibility also
existed that a fatal accident could occur to the Queen and the
government during the sea voyage . In the Netherlands an attitude
of defaitism would certainly grow . When the government continued
to stay in London (S3) although it was *certain that no temporary
advantages would be achieved for the East-Indies, the position of
the government and the motherland could be maintained . As the mi-
nister considered the interests of the motherland and the
government primary, he chose the third strategy. Based on the nominal pro-
babilities and the ordinal values(32) the decision maker used, mo-
dels of cell III (table 2) had to be tested and the lexicographic
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rule explained the choice . The minister chose the strategy where the
most important aspects had the highest value, i .e . a positive
value in this case.
Considering the first strategy the minister of Social Affairs was
certain that it would only have negative effects : it would not help
the East-Indies in the long run, while the government's absence
from the centre of decisions would be disadvantageous and the libe-
ration of the motherland would be considered solely a British act.
In the case where the government would continue to stay in London
(S3), its position would be maintained and the Dutch citizens would
not consider their liberation a British act . Based on the nominal
values and probabilities, models of cell IV (table 2) had to be
tested and Simon's or the Reversed Simon rule indeed produced the
choice.
Since there was at this time no clear majority in the Council of Mi-
nisters for the transference of the seat to the East-Indies, the
government decided to delay the decision in order to ask the Queen's
advice . Meanwhile, the Governor General also had proposed that at
least the ministers of Colonies and Foreign Affairs should briefly
come to the East-Indies in order to discuss further policies with
respect to Japan .(33)
As the Queen still had not changed her opinion on the East-Indies
plan the Council of Ministers finally decided on February 5 to send
the ministers of Colonies and Foreign Affairs for a short consulta-
tion to the East-Indies .(34) By then, the plan of the transference
of the seat of the government to the East-Indies had finally been
abandoned by the government.
Conclusions
Table 3 summarizes the decisions of the two phases after the simpli-
fications described in section 5 .3 were applied.
The table shows that in the first phase, all the decision makers
who explained their choice in detail, opted for the transference
of the seat of the government to the East-Indies . Only a small mi-
nority of the Council of Ministers was against it but did not give
its arguments . Since this course of action was strongly opposed by
the Queen, this strategy was considered by the Cabinet to be no
longer available . It is the first time in our research that we have
encountered a rejection of a strategy which did not occur on the
basis of decision theoretical arguments . As we have already men-
tioned above, the reason for rejecting this strategy might have been
the impossibility of consulting the parliament about it . The Cabinet
finally made a choice between the Queen's counter-proposal, i .e.
the transference of a minority of ministers to the East-Indies (S2)
and no transference (S3) . The Cabinet chose at the end of the first
phase to stay in London since this was perceived as less damaging
to its position than the second strategy.
During the second phase, it was mainly the ministers who were against
the transference of the seat who explained their choice in detail . An
interesting point is that the decision makers who preferred the first
strategy mostly argued that the position of the government
Table 3 : Evaluations of the different groups of decision makers during the different phases of the consequences for
the government and/or the East-Indies and the homeland which would most probably or possibly occur for the
strategies of the transference of the seat of the government (Si), the transference of a minority of mi-
nisters (S2) and no transference (S3)
Phase Consequences Governor General
of the East-Indies
Dutch government
-
I Dutch am-
bassadors
I
May position of the
May 31
Si x	S3
-
August
1940
government
position of the
East-Indies
position of the
homeland
+/-
	
+/-
+
	
+/-
0
	
0
position of the
government
position of the
East-Indies
position of the
homeland
July 13
	
July 19
Prime-Minister
	
Prime-Minister
Si x	S2
	
S3
	
S1 x	
+
	
-
	
-
	
+
	
-
+
	
O
	
-
	
O
	
O
+
	
O
	
-
	
O
	
O
position of the
government
position of the
East-Indies
position of the
homeland
August 7
S1x	S3
+
	
-
+
	
-
O
	
O
August 16, Min .of Foreign Affairs
S2
	
S3 x
-
	
+
O
	
'0
O
	
O
'
	
August 7
S1 x
	
+
	
-
+/-
	
0
O
	
-
II
Novem-
ber
1940
-
Janus-
ry
1941
position of the
government
position of the
East Indies
position of the
homeland
Nov .
	
16
Sl x	S3
+
	
-
+
	
-
O
	
O
January 17,18
Min .of Commerce Min .of Education Min .of Public Min .of Social
and Industries
	
Min .of Colonies
	
Works
	
Affairs
S1 x	
	
Si
	
S3 x
	 i
	
S3 x
	
SI
	
53 x
+
	
-
	
-
	
+
	
-
	
+
	
-
	
+
+
	
-
	
O
	
0
	
+
	
-
	
-
	
O
O
	
O
	
-
	
+
	
-
	
+
	
-
	
+
The abbreviations indicate the following : "x" the chosen strategy ; "+" a positive outcome ; "-" a negative outcome;
"O" the specific outcome was not considered by the decision maker;
"+/-" both outcomes considered as possible by the decision maker.
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would worsen if they continued to stay in London while it would
improve when they went to the East-Indies . They considered the
government to be too dependent on the British . The ministers who
preferred the third strategy argued, on the contrary, that the
position of the government was satisfactory and would continue to
be so if they stayed in London, while a transfer of the seat would
worsen its position . This group of decision makers attached much
value to the contact with the British.
Table 4 summarizes the results with respect to the relationship
between the quality of the data and the choice rules.
Table 4 : The relationship between the quality of the data and the
decision rules which produced the same choice as the de-
cision maker had indicated.
Quality of the data
The fitting model I II III IV total
SEU 0 0 0 0 0
Risk-avoiding 0 2 0 0 2
Lexicographic, Do-
minance or Addition 0 0 3 0 3
of Utilities
0 0 0 7 7Simon or
Reversed Simon
total 0 2 3 7 12
The table indicates that the decision makers tried to avoid compli-
cated descriptions, using rank-ordered utilities and probabilities
at the same time (class I models).
In two cases the rank-ordered probabilities were decisive (class II
model) and, in three cases, rank-ordered values (class III model).
In the remaining 7 cases, no rank-ordered characteristics were used
at all (class IV model) . This table clearly indicates, that in all
cases, the models which were expected to explain the choices could
indeed produce them . This is a remarkable result because this re-
lationship is not self evident, as we have mentioned before . The
fact that this perfect relationship nevertheless exists indicates
that the mode of formulating the probability and value statements
is a sufficient condition for the applicability of a decision rule
of the appropriate class . This suggests that given a specific des-
cription of the choice problem, i .e . the formulation of the proba-
bility and value statements, the choice rule is determined and
consequently every decision maker would come to the same conclusion.
In order to arrive at a different choice, decision makers have to
vary the probabilities and/or values . Table 3 provides a good over-
view of this process .(35)
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